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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Extortion is a phenomenon that can be understood from various disciplines, such as economics,1 criminology,2 the political sciences,3
and sociology.4 Each of these fields of knowledge emphasizes either the system or economic models under which extortionists and victims
operate, the short- or long-term relationship
sought by establishing simple or complex extortion mechanisms, the political relationship between extortionists and victims, or citizens’ perceptions of the institutional framework, which
can serve as a gateway for criminal groups to
create ties of protection through extortion.
The complexity of extortion, given the different
forms it can take and the ease with which it can
be confused or linked with other crimes, such
as kidnapping or corruption, calls for an open
discussion and the establishment of research
agendas. This report sheds light on the importance of extortive practices in Latin America. It
is based on qualitative research since 2019 that
includes 36 interviews of academics, public officials, police, professionals, and victims of extortion in 10 countries,5 along with a review of
all official public information and newspapers in
five countries during 2019.6
The research also focuses on working groups
and reviews official and civil society documents
related to extortion as a criminal phenomenon
throughout Latin America. The report is part of a
long-term research project that focuses on the
importance of this criminal activity, its possible
links to organized crime organizations, and the
policies designed to tackle its impact on businesses and citizens alike.
The report shows that extortive practices are
a regionwide trend, albeit with national, specific characteristics. Although it is primarily a
non-violent crime, an increasing tendency—
specifically linked to practices against women—should make it a priority for the public security agenda. Furthermore, extortion could be
depicted as the “perfect crime” since it is hardly
reported, let alone investigated. High levels of
impunity have allowed for this practice to move
into criminal organizations, prisons, and street
gangs; also, state officials and even business
partners use extortive practices to finance their
activities. There is a clear impact on democracy
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since corruption, fear of crime, and a general
sense of freedom from punishment corroborate
the idea that there is no rule of law.
Efforts toward understanding extortion remain
limited and need to take a central role in most
national and regional public security policies.

AN ELUSIVE CONCEPT
In European and North American scholarship,
the literature on extortion is abundant.7 Considered the defining activity of organized crime,8
extortion is strongly linked to territorial control and illegal activities. Scholars view extortion as an activity aimed at controlling territory
(i.e., power syndicate) and maximizing profits by
organizing and implementing illegal businesses and trafficking (i.e., enterprise syndicate).
Scholars point out that extortion is an easy
crime to commit since ‘‘it does not require any
high initial investments, it carries low managing costs and, in areas where State protection
is not regarded as adequate or reliable, it is also
a low-risk operation, because people at large
usually prefer to pay a low kickback than go
to the police.”9 Also, a criminal group needs to
demonstrate a working monopoly on the territory in which it operates, thus creating the potential for conflict with competing groups.
Extortion became the backbone of the “territorial sovereignty” of the Mafia.10 It gave it a local presence, did not require financial startup
costs, and relied on a complex network of relationships rather than a wealth of knowledge
of the locale.11 When the Mafia consolidates
its territorial control over a locale, this blurs
the line between legal and illegal businesses.
Regular citizens are often subject to extortionary practices, but extortion can also involve
individual criminals or non-organized crime
groups. Nevertheless, as Schelling12 indicates,
territory-bound groups seek monopolies in the
activities they pursue, and extortion is not an
exception.
Several factors facilitate the development of
extortive practices. At the institutional level, the
role of the state is critical; in fact, there is little
possibility for extortion to thrive in a territory
with a strong state presence. In other instances, the state “may choose to accommodate,
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collaborate with, or use the consolidating criminal organization for its own ends, or for various
reasons, including the desire to “top-up” wages
or because of a significant crossover in membership with criminal organizations.13 At the social level, the development of organized criminal
organizations requires the availability of a web
of individuals with the capacity and willingness
to engage in violence and a social and political
context in which they can be recruited. Third, at
the economic level, a sudden boom in a local
market typically opens the door for the need for
protective networks that could replace those
not implemented by the state.14
By researching the Camorra in Italy, Scaglione15
identifies three types of organizational modalities: (1) gangs of thieves (people intimidating
small neighborhoods), (2) extremely violent
young people located in specific territories to
commit crimes, and (3) highly skilled groups
specialized in predatory crimes such as extortion and robbery. All three types of organized
criminal groups developed territorial control;
however, maximizing profits is the primary goal
of the second and third groups. One important
element needing further analysis is the increasing involvement of women in extortive practices, specifically in managing racket activities
and illegal traffic.16

EXTORTION IN LATIN AMERICA
There is no official information that would allow
for a solid characterization of the problem in the
region. Still, there is ample qualitative information on the profound presence and complexities
of extortive practices and limited survey data
on self-reported extortion victimization. Over
the years, criminal organizations have diversified their activities in the region, and extortion
is perhaps the most widespread of these new
criminal ventures.17 When organized criminal
groups launch extortive practices in Latin America, they run little risk that victims will report the
crime to the police, particularly when extortion
targets illegal markets like prostitution, black
market trading, or illegal gambling. Even regular
citizens engaged in legal business activities are
unlikely to report the crime to the police due to
fear of reprisals and police complicity or ineffectiveness. Extortive practices have become
entrenched in the region and are the main ave-

nues for criminals to acquire cash.18
While researchers have only recently begun to
study the prevalence and impact of extortion in
Latin America, extortion has important effects at
the institutional, societal, and economic levels,
further undermining state capacity to effectively control widespread violence and corruption.
Indeed, a recent estimate identified extortion as
a key factor for migration and displacement in
Mexico, impacting more than 44,000 internally
displaced person.19
The first key conclusion from a review of all
available information is that extortive practices
are a region-wide phenomenon. For instance,
LAPOP data for 2016-2017 shows that victimization affected 19.1 percent of responders in
Mexico, 75 percent in El Salvador, 7.2 percent in
Guatemala, 8.5 percent in Honduras, and 14.8
percent in Peru. However, in each country, it
takes its own forms and differs regarding the
actors who practice it, its frequency, the type of
protection, the capacity of the police and institutions to address it, and the consequences for
the victims. It ranges from paying a few coins
to someone to keep an eye on a parked car to
kidnap ransoms to the long-term extortion of
storekeepers.
Only in Mexico did a recent study show that
extortion calls to businesses increased 22 percent between 2013 and 2019.20 Furthermore, in
2018, other researchers estimated that more
than 3.7 million extortion calls were made from
just seven prisons.21 In Bolivia, there is an increasing link to Colombian networks that use
Venezuelan migrants as collectors of extortive
payments.22 During the COVID-19 pandemic,
several gangs in El Salvador and Guatemala announced they would pardon or waive all charges
for informal vendors and small businesses due
to the health crisis. However, there is anecdotal
evidence that in countries like Guatemala and
Peru, intimidation has continued from those in
charge of the “gota a gota” (high-interest loan
schemes).23
This section presents findings from interviews
that reveal the phenomenon’s daily nature.
Companies, small and medium-sized storekeepers, the residents of underserved neighborhoods, and prisoners live with this practice,
having to pay an illicit tax to reach their homes
or work at their businesses. Although extortive
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methods have been studied in Central America
and Colombia, they are present in multiple other
countries. The following analysis highlights the
importance and specific dimensions of extortion in some of these countries.
In Argentina, interviewees report extortive
practices related to bribery and corruption on
the part of state agents and that extortion also
occurs in certain unions and social movements.
However, they recognize it is less common than
in other Latin American countries. The case of
one female victim is striking: she was asked
to protect someone guilty of medical malpractice rather than money. An everyday action like
writing a complaint about poor medical attention led to a threat that forced her to withdraw
the complaint so she would not lose her job as
a public official: “So I asked for the complaint
book, made the corresponding complaint, and
went home peacefully. I left my name and my
phone number because I’m making a complaint
that I consider fair. I receive a call from a person
who introduces herself as the wife of the doctor
against whom I am making the complaint telling me that they habitually eat with the governor
and that, if I did not withdraw the complaint, I
don’t know, they gave me two days to withdraw
the complaint, or I would lose my job that week.”
(female victim of extortion)
In Chile, one of the people interviewed alluded
to the figure of the “moneylender” as an extortive practice that occurs daily in street markets
and consists of a person lending money to another at high interest, leading to a debt which,
if not paid, is followed by threats. Another interviewee in Chile was the sister of an extortion
victim who had lost her phone and was threatened with disclosure of her personal information: “He [the extortionist] told her he was someone who worked in the technology sector and
had received a stolen phone and did she want it
back, and my sister obviously said yes, and the
guy said, “Well, you know it’s not that easy, the
phone is broken, it seems the thief dropped it, so
I need to unlock it because you know you don’t
want people to see your photos. I see here that
you go out with a girl,” and he began to name my
daughter. And he told her, “Here you have your
bank accounts, your credit cards, it would be
wrong for someone to get your phone and steal
them from you.” (sister of extortion victim)
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In Costa Rica, interviews revealed various forms
of extortion, but with a lower prevalence than in
other Central American countries. One type of
extortion identified is political extortion, which
occurs in the case of vice-mayors. Women who
are elected are forced to resign for the sake of
their personal safety, creating a vacancy for a
man. This is a clear example of gender extortion.
In Peru, there was consensus among those
interviewed that extortion is a daily practice
that occurs mostly in the north of the country,
in cities such as Trujillo or Chiclayo, affecting
predominantly small and medium-sized storekeepers who must “pay a fee” to pursue their
activities. This extortion is practiced in an organized way by bands with territorial control.
In the case of actors, three types of extortionists were identified in Peru. First, unions or
gangs linked to civil construction extort money from companies by requesting jobs (a real
or “ghost” job)24 or the payment of protection
money. For the companies involved, this practice has become normalized and is part of their
cost structure. Second, criminal bands mostly
dedicated to crimes such as drug trafficking use
extortion as a permanent source of financing;
most of their victims are related to such “commerce.” Finally, there are extortionists not linked
to criminal gangs who find extortion provides an
occasional opportunity to boost their income.
Interviewees in El Salvador agreed that a broad
and complex extortion network exists in their
country, involving state agents, civilians, and
people linked to crime. They estimate that extortion began to become prevalent in 2005,
occurring principally in prisons, impoverished
neighborhoods (where there are different levels of fees), and small and medium-sized businesses. In the latter, employees, neighborhood
gangs, or businesspeople from the same sector
practice it.
As in the case of El Salvador, a broad extortion
network is found in Guatemala, but with different
characteristics. Here, it is practiced principally
by criminal gangs linked to crimes such as hired
killings and homicide and, therefore, involves a
high level of violence against the victims. These
gangs carry out both telephone and in-person
extortion. In telephone extortion, 10 percent of
victims are studied beforehand, and 90 percent are randomly selected. Copycats also con-
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duct this type of extortion to try their luck with
this crime. In-person extortion by these gang
members affects mostly the inhabitants of lower-income neighborhoods, those who transport
goods, and storekeepers. Second-order actors
also appear in Guatemala’s extortion scenario.
It is widely recognized that judges and public
officials are “bought” to not obstruct criminal
activity and serve as gang accomplices.25 To
further complicate matters, there are also false
victims in the form of people who claim to suffer
extortion to obtain a migration permit to leave
the country.
In Guatemala, one interviewee recounted being
a permanent victim of extortion, a woman with
a stationery business who had paid protection
money for a decade. The gangs gave her a mobile telephone to communicate with her. The
extortion was systematic and, if she failed to
pay, put her life at risk. She has become “accustomed” to the situation and does not see a
way out. “So that you can work in your store, you
have to pay a tax to be able to work; if you don’t,
they kill you. I have escaped being killed several
times. It is very difficult. You can say, ‘Ah, I’ve got
used to living like this and it’s what I have to do
to survive,’ but each consequence causes very
strong effects on your personal and family life.
You will never know how they are going to attack
you.” (female victim of extortion)
In Colombia, interviewees reported various
types of extortion that have traditionally been
linked to the financing of guerrillas and paramilitaries and occurred in localities near guerrilla
settlements as a means of financing the life and
activity of these groups. It subsequently began
to be practiced by criminal organizations and
copycats,26 affecting both companies and individuals. In the latter case, there is the so-called
“drop by drop,” in which extortionists obtain a
permanent income by exacting small amounts
(drops). In other words, there are two extortion
systems in Colombia. Although both offer protection in exchange for money, they have different purposes; the guerrillas aim to change the
model of society, while criminals or gangs seek
to increase their income or expand the territory they control. Extorting storekeepers is also
a feature of everyday life. Anyone can appear
at a business and demand protection money,
which the business owner pays without knowing whether that person is really part of a criminal organization and if protection would actually

be provided. Similarly, extortion occurs among
storekeepers themselves relating to the sale of
a particular product, a practice known as “exporting the model to other sectors.” According
to Colombian experts, extortion brings security
to parts of the country where the state does not
exert territorial control.
As mentioned by an expert “extortion related
to the Colombian guerilla movement has also
affected the border area of neighboring Ecuador, where false guerillas sowed terror”. In other
parts of Ecuador, extortion is practiced by those
linked to drug trafficking to complement income
obtained from drug sales. There is also an elevated level of extortion practiced in prisons as a
mechanism for survival in confinement. In other words, in Ecuador (as in Colombia), there are
two extortion systems; one linked to Colombian
activity but with “imitators,” and another associated with drug trafficking.
In Mexico, there is an extensive extortion network practiced principally by criminal bands for
which it is their primary activity. State agents
also extort ordinary citizens who seek protection. Extortion can be conducted by phone,
from prison, or in person. The victims vary depending on the region and could be business
travelers, Indigenous groups, local inhabitants,
formal and informal shopkeepers and vendors,
or ordinary citizens.
According to interviewees from the non-governmental organization (NGO), “México Unido
Contra la Delincuencia,” criminal bands practice
four types of extortion:27
(1) Between 2011 and 2014, they used telephone calls to demand a ransom from a family
member, with a (supposedly) kidnapped child
crying in the background.
(2) The extortionist pretends they are a relative visiting from the United States, who
has run into a problem on the border that
they need money to resolve. The extortionist
claims they are in a dangerous situation with
little time to talk and asks for money.
(3) Cobro de piso—or literally, “fee for the
floor”—is the illicit tax levied on storekeepers
by representatives of drug cartels or copycats.
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(4) Business travelers staying at hotel chains
can be extorted in their room with the complicity of hotel workers and are asked for
money against a threat of surveillance, which
could lead to abduction.

consequences. Our research found three types
of extortive practices:
•

Interviewees in Mexico also described extortion
by the police, which, they say, “has happened
all their lives,” as well as the extortion of storekeepers and Indigenous people in places where
the extraction of natural resources takes place.
In Mexico, a large part of the economy is informal, a risk factor for extortion. Within this informality, there is a “formalization” of extortion
through symbols, such as stickers on taxis to
indicate protection by extortion bands. Interviewees also referred to the trend’s invisibility;
as a mid-level albeit permanent issue, it does
not appear on the public agenda. The permanent—yet inevitable—existence of extortion in
Mexico is reflected in such phrases as “like a
mushroom that grows” or “like lemons in agriculture.”
It can be concluded from the accounts of the
interviewees in this study that extortion exists
in all the countries analyzed but with important
differences. It can be infrequent, as in the cases
of Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica, or part of
complex networks that involve a series of actors and crimes, such as in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico. Its purpose can
range from “trying their luck” for people who use
it as a quick way to make money to the criminal
bands for whom it is a permanent livelihood and
means of controlling residential and commercial
neighborhoods.
In addition, the interviews indicate that extortion is an understudied phenomenon with little
visibility in some countries such as Argentina
and Ecuador. Its characterization, therefore,
provides a valuable opportunity to learn more
about it. This next section will analyze the different types of extortion.

TYPES OF EXTORTION
Extortion is a chameleonic crime. During fieldwork, it was possible to identify different actors, frequencies, forms, territories, victims, and

7

•

•

Episodic: There is a presence of opportunistic crime that develops when a citizen
without significant ties to criminal activity
decides to “try their luck” through telephone calls to obtain money. The victim,
selected at random, suffers extortion only
once, and the crime is rarely reported to
the police. An example is the extortion of
specific online celebrities to avoid the release of personal information.
Intermittent: This type of extortion is
mostly related to practices that have small
and medium businesses as victims of frequent extortion. For instance, in Peru, most
construction companies refer to standard
extortive methods during the development
of a project.
Systematic: This is the case in neighborhoods and businesses in which extortion is
a daily practice. Examples include exacting
payment to enter a neighborhood in Guatemala or protection money paid by storekeepers and taxi drivers to pursue their
activities. Residents and storekeepers who
are the victims feel threatened and pay a
double tax to the extortionists.

Extortion also takes different forms. It can be
by telephone as in the calls made by bands or
prison inmates, online as in the case of sextortion, or in-person when the extortionist approaches the victim to demand money, whether
at the victim’s home, workplace, or in the street.
Moreover, it can be simple when it involves just
an extortionist and the victim, or complex, involving a network with different actors operating through various mechanisms involving
criminal organizations specialized in this crime.
Examples of the latter include the systems of
extortion identified in Colombia, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Mexico.
In terms of location, there are important differences between countries, however, the extortive practices have some similar features.
•

•

Underserved neighborhoods where the
state does not have a strong presence
create an opportunity for bands or gangs
to take control of the territory.
Prisons in which extortion occurs among
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•

•
•

the inmates (Ecuador) and through telephone calls to the outside world (Guatemala and Mexico).
Commercial areas where the victims own
small or medium-sized businesses and are
offered certain protections in exchange for
a daily or monthly payment (Colombia and
Peru).
Sectors in Colombia and parts of Ecuador
where guerrillas or paramilitary groups operate.
Places where economic activities occur,
such as Peru (civil construction), Argentina
(oil unions), and Mexico (areas for the extraction of natural resources and tourism).

Extortion may or may not be related to other
crimes, but some are dedicated exclusively to
it. In other cases, there is a link to drug trafficking (Colombia), express kidnapping (Ecuador),
homicide (Guatemala), or mugging (Peru). In the
Mexican case, it is interesting to note that extortion arose from kidnapping when the latter
proved insufficiently profitable, as described by
one interviewee: “There was a time when kidnapping was contained, then the bands dedicated to
kidnapping began to venture into extortion. They
were bands that already had experience in other types of criminal activities. Extortion is faster because, in kidnapping, you have to invest in
security with the people who are going to watch
[the victim]; as a criminal, you expose yourself
much more because, in extortion, you can make
10 calls at the same time and someone will fall
for it, two or three fall for it. I get money much
faster and there is not as much exposure.”
Finally, the consequences of extortion depend
on its level of complexity and range from a
one-off payment to sustained payments over
time, as well as serious physical and psychological consequences for the victims. The victim
from Argentina recounts that, when threatened
with losing her job, she decided to withdraw
her complaint against the doctor who had performed a substandard surgery on her daughter:
“I got home, gathered my children and told them,
‘This is what is happening to me.’ I have always
said that you have to be consistent with principles but, at this moment, it is either bread on the
table or being true to my principles, and I went
and withdrew the complaint. But I took it as a
lesson for my children too, that morality some-

times confronts us with situations where one has
to decide, and it is very difficult to say what is
moral and what is not.”

In other words, extortion is a diverse world. Protection payments have countless characteristics such as those described in interviewee accounts and raise questions that call for further
investigation.

IMPUNITY
The diversity of forms that extortion takes also
implies difficulties in its handling by the police
and the judicial system. The interviews conducted for this study and the review of databases with official information indicate that the
most critical limitation is that extortion is minimally reported or not reported at all in some
countries.
According to Colombia’s 2019 Survey of Coexistence and Citizen Security,28 extortion was
the country’s second least frequent crime, with
a victimization rate of 2.3 percent but an estimated non-reporting rate of 81.4 percent. One
interviewee referred to the reasons for not reporting: “There is very great distrust of the authorities. And the authorities are not very effective in counteracting this type of crime. So, the
population decides not to report it because it
seems to them that there are no immediate or
effective actions that can counteract the crime.
Reports exist but are minimal. Above all, they appear when it affects large businesses, when it
affects private companies that are being asked
for exorbitant amounts, when it affects the state
itself, and when it affects some actors in the territory with a certain level of power. But in everyday life, when the armed actor knocks on your
door to ask for money because they are watching
you or when they ask public transport to pay so
many times a week, it really is a small amount
but gets bigger and bigger. Before, it was very
difficult to acknowledge this publicly; in private
everyone experienced it … although the way it is
denounced is insignificant.”
Although data about extortion in Mexico is
available from surveys,29 interviewees asserted that “it is not something that is reported,
investigated, and pursued,” citing a high level

8

of non-reporting, which reaches 97.9 percent
according to the 2018 National Survey of Victimization and Perceptions of Public Security
survey30 and 97.4 percent per the 2017 National Victimization Companies Survey (Encuesta
Nacional de Victimización de Empresas or ENVE).31 Interviewees from the México Unido Contra la Delincuencia NGO pointed to differences
in data for the country’s different states: “The
figures fluctuate a lot. They rise violently in one
month and fall sharply in another. One of our hypotheses has to do with the fact that these are
the cases that are reported and lead to an investigation; it is not that we are seeing the criminal
phenomenon per se, but simply what reaches
the ears and hands of the authorities, and what
the authorities decide to pursue.” Similarly, they
add: “There is very little reliable information from
official records. The executive secretary of the
national public security system has appalling records for this crime.”
In Peru, the National Institute of Statistics and
Informatics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e
Información or INEI) conducts the National Survey of Budget Programs.32 In 2018, INEI reported that 0.3 percent of those surveyed had been
a victim of extortion in the previous 12 months,
representing a total of 153 cases. However, it
also showed that only 24.5 percent of those
suffering extortion reported it, since the victim
felt it was a waste of time (29.3 percent), they
could not identify the offender (26.8 percent),
it was a minor crime (16.3 percent), distrust of
the police (11.4 percent), fear of retaliation by
the offender (8.9 percent), and other reasons
(7.3 percent).
Similarly, the Extortion Report33 provides data
for 2010 to 2016 and indicates that less than
1.26 percent of the national population suffered extortion. In 2015 at the national level,
30,807 women and 21,918 men were victims of
extortion; in 2016, these figures were 25,794
and 26,308, respectively. As of 2016, of those
in prison for extortion, 89 percent were men
and 11 percent were women; the reporting rate
reached 12.3 percent in 2016.
This data is consistent with the comments of
the academics interviewed. The low rate of extortion reflects a reporting/recording problem:
“In Peru, there is no evidence in statistical terms
that the crime of extortion is a major problem. It
is a recording problem. However, it is true that,
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especially since 2014, there has been an increase in data on victims of the crime of extortion associated with the use of cellphones, social
networks, and public transport too, among other mechanisms.” The elusive form of extortive
practices has a clear impact on a general sense
of impunity and lack of protection by all victims.
Both official statistical data and the accounts
of different interviewees show there is more we
do not know about extortion. Current statistics
are a gateway to a world for which numbers
are largely lacking. The frequency, quality, and
level of complexity of surveys and the capacity
to produce generalizable information are challenges in this area.
A second limitation in addressing extortion
is the position taken by some of its actors. In
the case of telephone extortion from prisons
in Guatemala, the telephone companies do not
collaborate by restricting telephone signals
from prisons or identifying the origin of calls.
Their motives are economic—they make money
from the calls: “The key link in extortion is telecommunications, mostly cell phones. I would say
that, if there is a card that should be removed
from the house of cards of extortion, it would be
to control the telephonic aspect” (police officer, Guatemala). Also in Guatemala, we identify another problem linked to the co-opting of
government officials such as judges and prosecutors and people from civil society who, as
described by interviewees, have ties to gangs
and receive benefits for covering up extortion:
“With the resources, they pay lawyers, judges,
and prosecutors; they buy them.”
A third limitation lies in the connection between
extortion and economic informality. This can be
seen in Chile in the moneylenders who operate
in street markets and, in Peru, in the fee paid
by informal vendors to continue their trade. According to one Peruvian interviewee: “Here extortion meets informality because we have mayors who have been detained for charging fees
through groups, for giving a square meter in the
best shopping center for the installation of an
informal business, a cart on the street but, even
for that square meter, you have to pay a fee.”
Finally, another aspect revealed by interviewees is the lack of sound criminal investigation,
even when reporting takes place. In Mexico,
where extortion is carried out primarily by tele-
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phone, it is unusual for an investigation to result in arrests. Trial and impunity rates are as
high as 99 percent. “Impunity has exacerbated
the phenomenon. The possibility that they will be
punished, that they will be found is very low. The
black figure is very high. There is a lot of fear.
Citizens in Mexico move around fearfully.” (consultant, Mexico).
The lack of proper criminal investigation in Peru
is also behind an increase in extortion. Although
it is a practice that has been developing for 10
to 15 years, it has not led to more complex levels of organization or violence. Considering this,
one academic interviewed argued: “My hypothesis is that the networks behind this phenomenon have clear criminal niches and subsist within
this target range. They do not aspire to be a giant cartel or a complex organization. This smallscale extortion generates profits and grows at
that level, like a mushroom that advances.” This
is consistent with the arguments of another interviewee, according to whom extortion in Peru:
“Is like lemons in agriculture. In agriculture you
plant, I don’t know, avocados once a year, but
you have to plant lemons because they are your
petty cash, it comes in constantly all year round”.

CONSEQUENCES
The impact of extortion has numerous dimensions, not only for the victims but also for the
economy, state, and judiciary. This section examines three types of effects. First, it highlights
gender issues by looking in greater depth at
the relationship between women and extortion,
based on interviews and research. Second, it
assesses the consequences for the companies
and economies that are victims of this crime
and, finally, its implications at the institutional
level.
Impact on democracy
Extortion has a negative impact on democratic
systems due to the involvement of state agents
in extortion practices. It also affects the country’s tax burden and harms ties and trust among
the actors in society. In interviews, various
people mentioned the deep damage extortion
causes to the foundations of society.

Extortion is traditionally understood as the
payment of money in exchange for protection,
protection that should be guaranteed by the
state, given its monopoly on the use of force.
But when the state structure is weak, groups
step in to offer what it does not provide. One interviewee said, “From fear to acceptance, there
is but one step. That is where extortion occurs.
It becomes protection.” In other words, mafias
linked to extortion begin to compete with the
state. A Mexican interviewee referred to this as
double statehood: “The extortion of citizens by
security agents (the police, traffic, and immigration services) and illegal networks of organized
violence (telephone extortion, telephone scams,
‘cobro de piso’) arises from two different types
of statehood. Illegal statehood operates where
the state is not present or has a very weak presence, coexisting as mechanisms for the illegal
distribution of income, generally associated with
types of violence such as threats or homicide.”
In addition to this competition in places where
the state has a weak presence, state actors can
be involved in extortion processes, creating a
feeling of helplessness among the population.
A victim from Guatemala said: “You can also see
that the state is involved because they know everything. I don’t know how they know everything.
They find out about everything and sometimes
I think that the state, the police are involved in
all this.” Similarly, according to an interviewee
in Ecuador, “Extortion is where crime begins to
eat away at one’s feelings about what citizenship is, the concept of living under the rule of
law. It’s basically because there are people who,
suddenly, in a feeling of helplessness, may be
motivated to accept extortion and not have any
capacity to denounce it to the states ... The effect of extortion, beyond fear, is that it begins to
eat away at the principles of daily life under the
rule of law.”
An interviewee in Uruguay also argued that:
“There are economic consequences that have to
do with the criminal modality itself, but there is
also a set of consequences in terms of weakening the social fabric in the communities, of fear,
of weakening public institutions and the state
because, when there is extortion, the law is not
prevailing. It’s not the legal or legitimate authorities who are regulating these social relations, it
is imposition. It is a phenomenon of violence in
which one individual prevails over another and
applies his actions. It weakens beliefs and the tie
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that exists between citizens and the state.”
The Feminization of Extortion
This research indicates that women can occupy
different positions in the extortion process: as
a victim, intermediary or facilitator, or offender.
There are some types of extortion where women tend to be the main victims, principally sextortion, extortion of sex workers, and political
extortion.
In a patriarchal society, women who participate
in crime or violent groups can also suffer or be
exposed to practices against them by members
of their own criminal bands. In Central America,
women who join a gang are subject to several
rituals of a sexual nature, ranging from fidelity to a partner who does not have to comply
with the same norm to having sex with different
gang members.34 Women gang members are, in
general, “discriminated, paralyzed and subordinated through the generation of events of injustice, exploitation, and misogyny.”35 At the same
time, there is a gender-based division of labor
between men and women. One of the roles that
women gang members fulfill is that of “mules,”
guarding weapons and drugs, keeping watch,
and serving as a communications bridge by
collecting fees for services.36 This role is fundamental for the gang’s survival because men, as
outlaws, have a more restricted field of action.
This increased presence of women does not
necessarily imply an expansion of their power
within the organization.
Analyzing the participation of women in extortion bands or groups is complex. Although it has
been studied, the literature is mostly qualitative,
with some dominant discourses about the motivation or role of women within these organizations.37 Still, women’s participation in the crime
of extortion is high. InSight Crime, a non-profit
journalism and investigative organization, reports that in Guatemala, extortion is the most
common crime among women in prison, and
the figures have increased since 2009. In 2014,
there were 382 women in prison for extortion.
By 2017, this figure had doubled to 791, out of
a total of 2,612 women in jail countrywide, according to official data.38 The singularity of Guatemala is that it typifies women’s participation
in extortion as a crime, but in many cases, they
are unaware of this.
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The interviews conducted reveal the participation of women in extortion practices in Guatemala and El Salvador, but with different characteristics. First, they show that women may
be forced to participate in extortion because of
an emotional or family tie with an imprisoned
extortionist: “Many women who were partners,
sisters, mothers of gang members were used for
the process of collecting extortion money and we
believe that, with the closure of communications
from prisons, they are no longer pressured to get
involved. Consequently, fewer people are going
to jail.” Another interviewee said, “There are
cases where they are asked for ‘proof of love’;
that, if a girl wants to show her love for her boyfriend, she had to go to bed with him. Now, the
proof of love is to extort money for my love, a
gang member who is in jail.” Vulnerable adolescents are also used to transport telephones.
The interviews also show that women can be
tricked into participating in extortion operations
without realizing they are committing a crime.
For instance, this occurs when a woman allows
her bank account to be used to deposit money and is subsequently arrested. In Guatemala, for example, this is typified as a crime and
has resulted in an increase in the number of
incarcerated women.39 One interviewee noted:
“Increasing numbers of women are imprisoned
because they lend to relatives, gang members,
or criminals, or people who are already in prison
and who, from prison, are involved in some way
in extortion.”
Moreover, some women participate in extortion
voluntarily and even take leadership roles in
criminal organizations. In El Salvador and Honduras, interviewees indicate that women have
moved from being simple receivers of extortion
payments to administering complex extortion
circuits and may even have ties to other crimes
such as hired killings.
A second way of investigating the woman-extortion relationship is to analyze the crime of
sextortion. This consists of blackmail or a threat
of a sexual type in which the offender has intimate material about the victim, such as photographs of a sexual nature, and demands money
to prevent their publication.40 Extortion of this
type can occur between adolescents or adults
and men or women and is a form of sexual exploitation. In this case, it is the image of the victim for which protection is provided, although
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the extortion may also be related to other phenomena such as grooming, sexting, and even
pornography.
Another form of sexual extortion is the phenomenon known as sexual corruption, which occurs
in a situation of abuse of power in which the
victim is required to provide a favor or benefit of
a sexual nature. This has occurred, for example,
in the case of sex workers in Chile41 and Argentina,42 in which the police have been accused
of institutional violence by exacting sexual favors or bribes as an alternative to arrest. When
sex work is undertaken in a context of illegality,
women are vulnerable to extortion and sexual
abuse.
Transparency International43 conducted a study
in 2019 on institutional violence related to
corruption where sex is the currency for paying bribes or accessing government services,
education, or healthcare. In Central America—
particularly in the Northern Triangle (Honduras,
El Salvador, and Guatemala)—sexual extortion
occurs in two forms: either the manner of payment or a sexual threat behind the extortion.
According to InSight Crime, “For women living in
gang territory, the threat of sexual violence is
ubiquitous. Gangs are known to pressure their
victims to pay, threatening them with sexual
violence against their wives and daughters. In
other cases, when the victim cannot satisfy the
extortionists’ monetary demands, the payment
can be made in-kind.”44 The characteristic of
this type of extortion is that it occurs in neighborhoods where gangs and organized crime are
present.
A review of the official data on sextortion from
the countries studied did not yield results.
Where there are records, the data is not classified separately from other possible types of
extortion. Moreover, not all countries classify
reports of extortion according to the gender of
the person reporting it. In Argentina, El Salvador, and Guatemala, for example, most reports
are made by men. The information available on
sextortion is, therefore, mostly qualitative in
nature.

Impact on Businesses
The economic effects of extortion and its impact on companies are enormous, affecting
both the resources of poor people and private
sector opportunities for economic development
in various countries. Based on interviewee accounts and official data, it is possible to characterize these consequences.
In Argentina, one interviewee alluded to the
problems faced by oil companies due to their
extortion by unions: “It creates economic problems, problems for companies and workers because they cannot do their business and it causes great economic damage. The problems at oil
companies are also notorious. Even in the case
of the oil industry, which is a strategic sector.
Mafia union groups have threatened it.”
In Guatemala small storekeepers who are extorted face a double tax burden and obstacles
to starting a business. “There are people who
are starting a business or want to start a business and, based on what they have heard, extortion stops them or reduces their interest in starting one. That has a clear impact on the country’s
economy.” Similarly, the account of an extortion
victim, a small business owner, shows it is a tax
from which she has no escape: “I pay extortion
for my business, and I do it because [the business] is a source of income that helps me cover
expenses with my children.”
In El Salvador, interviewees noted that the high
rate of non-reporting makes it difficult to estimate the annual revenue generated by extortion. However, the Business Competitiveness
Survey45 looks at how it affects local companies.
One important result concluded that crime is
the main situational factor affecting corporate
competitiveness, despite a significant decrease
between 2015 (28.7 percent) and 2017 (20 percent). Extortion is the main crime suffered by
companies (48 percent), followed by the theft
of vehicles or merchandise (42 percent). Out
of the companies affected by extortion in the
last quarter of 2017, most were medium-sized
businesses (11.6 percent), followed by large
companies (9.8 percent), small businesses (3.3
percent), and micro-businesses (8.8 percent).
The 2015 National Survey of Victimization of
Companies in Central America (ENVECA46) covered 360 companies in Honduras. Including
various types of extortion, it demonstrated
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that 47.1 percent of the companies surveyed
were victims of this crime. The principal measures they adopted were to stop handling cash
(44 percent), reduce hours of production/sale
of services (29.4 percent), and cancel product
distribution routes (26.5 percent).
Interviewees in Mexico mentioned the different economic consequences that extortion has
for the entire population due to its nature as
a double tax and the threat it poses in places
that depend on trade, such as tourist areas. The
effects on these areas are evident in the account of one interviewee: “If you like something
and want to buy it again, the store is no longer
there. What happens is that businesses cannot
withstand the ‘cobro de piso;’ on Quinta Avenida,
everyone pays it. It affects companies and small
storekeepers who live off their business.” Similarly, the ENVE47 survey, which analyzes economic units, found the most common crimes in
2017 were theft or assault on merchandise, followed by pilfering and, in third place, extortion,
with a rate of 544 cases per 10,000 economic
units, down from 666 in 2015. Regarding crimes
reported to the police, there were 525,000 cases of extortion in 2017, equivalent to a rate of
1,150 per 10,000 economic units. In 86.9 percent of cases, the extortion was by telephone,
and in 8.3 percent of the cases, the demands
were paid. The average annual monetary loss in
2017 was 8,584 Mexican pesos (US$431 as of
2017), the lowest figure among all the crimes
recorded.
Peru’s Extortion Report48 for 2015 shows that
15 percent of 192,762 companies suffered extortion. In 2016, the figure fell to 9.1 percent
out of 226,116 companies. By economic sector,
the incidence of extortion in 2015 was highest in construction (55.5 percent), followed by
commerce and vehicle repair (18.4 percent),
and manufacturing (18 percent). In 2016, it was
highest in fishing (31.1 percent), followed by
mining (28.8 percent), and construction (23.2
percent).
Interviewees in Peru highlighted the case of
civil construction where extortion payments are
incorporated into a project’s cost structure. One
interviewee explained: “What has this implied?
In the case of civil construction, the hiring of
security companies that act as an intermediary
between the company and the criminal syndicate. In other cases, the person who puts up a
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stall has to make daily or weekly payments to
the owner of the territory in order not to have
problems. Beyond safety, which is important, I
feel that the main problem is an economic issue
because the cost of not having problems ends
up being transferred to the cost structure of
those small entrepreneurs. It does not affect all
citizens, just small and mid-sized entrepreneurs.”

A COURSE OF ACTION
One of the main weaknesses identified by this
fieldwork is the availability of official information about extortion in the countries studied.
The high percentage of non-reporting and the
scarcity of comparable figures make it difficult
to reach conclusions as a basis for defining
clear measures to address this crime. However,
it is possible to establish some basic recommendations regarding the data:
•

•

•

•

•

Use national surveys to measure extortion. Since non-reporting is high and interest in reporting low, a useful approach
is to use national surveys on security,
victimization, and the characterization of
households and companies.
Present extortion data in percentages or
rates. Some countries present extortion
data in absolute numbers, making it difficult to compare different contexts.
Differentiate data by the gender of the
respondent. Together with sextortion, this
would help shed light on forms of violence
against women not currently considered in
studies.
Include types of extortion in questions.
The interviews conducted for this study
showed that extortion could range from a
phone call to a kidnapping, with different
levels of violence exercised by the extortionists. As a result, the word “extortion”
alone could refer to a variety of crimes that
each warrant specific analysis.
Identify the temporality of the extortion.
The interviews also showed that extortion could be episodic, as in a telephone
call, or sustained over time as experienced by storekeepers in some countries.
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•

Identify the non-monetary consequences of extortion. It is necessary to estimate the economic impacts of extortion
to demonstrate the phenomenon’s great
magnitude. At the same time, it is crucial
not to lose sight of its non-economic consequences, such as a feeling of insecurity,
its effect on values, or, when extortion is
sustained over time, even serious psychological problems.

it must be paid every day but is, nonetheless,
not reported. This makes specialization in the
investigative work undertaken by the police,
together with government ministries, of fundamental importance.

As the information on extortion increases in
quality and coverage, it will be possible to better investigate it, identifying the diversity of
forms it takes in different contexts and temporalities and considering that, at present, what
we do not know about this crime exceeds what
we do know.
Another critical aspect of approaching extortion
is to understand its multiple forms and generate specific mechanisms for addressing each of
them. In the case of telephone extortion, preventive initiatives or campaigns can be applied.
This already occurs in some countries, such as
Guatemala, where the police implement preventive campaigns and educate the population on
how to answer cold calls and, thus, avoid falling
for scams.
Extortion may be creating a parallel state by
providing the protection needed to live in a
community and collecting taxes to support a
system of crime. Its low visibility on the public agenda of several of the countries studied is
concerning.
If state agents are involved in extortion systems
or the authorities do not prioritize extortion because they consider it a minor crime, its understanding is diminished, and the victims’ perception of helplessness grows. This is also the case
when addressing gender issues, geographical
factors, how it affects Indigenous peoples, and
other issues about which little is known in either the literature or institutional framework.
To conclude, extortion is far more closely related to structural phenomena and organized
crime than to opportunistic or common crime.
Therefore, it calls for more intelligence and a
specialized approach from the police and government ministries. In underserved neighborhoods in Latin America, extortion is a constant;
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